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ABSTRACT. To adequately respond to crises, adaptive governance is crucial, but sometimes institutional adaptation is constrained,
even when a society is faced with acute hazards. We hypothesize that economic inequality, defined as unequal ownership of wealth and
access to resources, crucially interacts with the way institutions function and are adapted or not. Because the time span for societal
responses may be lengthy, we use the historical record as a laboratory to test our hypothesis. In doing so, we focus on floods and water
management infrastructure. The test area is one where flood hazards were very evident—the Low Countries (present-day Netherlands
and Belgium) in the premodern period (1300–1800)—and we employ comparative analysis of three regions within this geographical
area. We draw two conclusions: first, both equitable and inequitable societies can demonstrate resilience in the face of floods, but only
if  the institutions employed to deal with the hazard are suited to the distributive context. Institutions must change parallel to any
changes in inequality. Second, we show that institutional adaptation was not inevitable, but also sometimes failed to occur. Institutional
adaptation was never inevitably triggered by stimulus of a hazard, but dependent on socio-political context. Even when vital for the
community under threat, adaptation only tended to occur when the vested interests of those with wealth, resources, and power were
directly hit.
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INTRODUCTION
Environmental hazards and the disasters they can create are no
longer seen as simply natural events, but processes that test the
capacity of society to organize itself, limit destabilization, and
recover (Pelling 2003, Blaikie et al. 2004, Tierney 2007). Disasters
are thus social phenomena, where different qualities of societies
are crucial in determining coping capacities: absorbing the impact
of unforeseen shocks, accommodating their occurrence, and
reorganizing to better deal with them in the future (Folke et al.
2005). Success is not only dependent on wealth, technology, and
physical infrastructure, but also on the softer qualities of that
society, a crucial one being institutional infrastructure and the
extent to which this can be adapted (Walker et al. 2004, Folke et
al. 2010). A key component of resilience in response to hazards
is now said to be the capacity for institutional adaptation (Engle
2011). This is highly relevant in light of recent developments.
Although engineered and technological adaptation options
remain important in climate change policies, the 2014 assessment
report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
observes a growing awareness of the value of “ecosystem-based,
institutional, and social measures” (IPCC 2014:8). At the same
time, however, the IPCC acknowledged that adaptive capacities
remained highly context-dependent, although we have limited
evidence on these “context-specific determinants of vulnerability
and adaptive capacity” (Klein et al. 2014:908).  
We need, therefore, to better understand how societal
characteristics exactly enhance or decrease the capacity to
implement effective coping mechanisms and adaptive strategies.
Why are some societies capable of institutional adaptation and
yet others are not, even when faced with serious hazards? Social
capital, social networks, trust, collective action, coordination,
education, and training are often singled out as crucial to foster
adaptation (Adger 2003, Barnes et al. 2017, Bodin 2017), while
mismatches in scale between environmental and social dynamics
(Cumming et al. 2006) and power asymmetries (Crona and Bodin
2010) might hamper or complicate adaptation. However, the
number of potential variables is so large, and their relationships
so complex, that analysis is difficult. Accordingly, studies often
remain descriptive or follow an inductive approach, where a
conspicuous aspect of the society in question is privileged as
possible cause.  
We aim to better understand the role of societal qualities by
highlighting two specific ones associated with resilience: (a)
formal institutions and institutional adaptation (already often
mentioned and investigated in relation to resilience) and (b)
material inequality (increasingly mentioned in relation to
resilience but not investigated much in literature on the adaptive
capacities of socio-environmental systems). We show how the two
conjointly affect a society’s resilience to hazards and, furthermore,
how the effect of one component can only be understood in
relation to the other. First, we analyze how material inequality
can affect the functioning of the formal institutions and
associated organizations needed to cope with storm surges and
high water tables, and second we assess to what extent these water
management institutions can adapt in the aftermath of floods.
(a) Inequality and resilience
Research increasingly suggests that material inequality may affect
coping strategies or adaptive capacities after hazards. Empirical
research, however, is very limited. At the household level the
impact of wealth on coping strategies has provided inconclusive
results (Hoddinott 2006, Béné et al. 2016). Studies have
established a positive correlation between income inequality and
increased susceptibility to disastrous outcomes from natural
hazards in present-day countries (Castillo and Hillier 2013).
When the number of natural disasters is held constant, and
controlling for national wealth, countries with less income
inequality (as well as more democratic nations) suffer fewer deaths
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from disasters, as observed for a set of 57 countries analyzed for
the period 1980–2002, with the effect of income inequality found
to be very large (Kahn 2005). However, what is it precisely about
inequality that makes a society less able to cope or adapt?
Although poverty may hamper adaptive capacities (Carter et al.
2007, Carpenter and Brock 2008), inequalities in the distribution
of resources often remain undiscussed. The causal relationship
between the two, distribution and resilience, is hidden from view,
and remains based on implicit assumption or logical intuition. In
this paper, we explore an intermediary phase (institutional
configurations) linking the two; that is to say we examine how the
distributive context can shape the effective employment of the
institutions necessary for societal resilience.
(b) Hazards and institutional adaptation
Some literature emphasizes a loop-feedback process with a
positive outcome, whereby environmental hazards become the
stimulus or trigger for institutional adaptation, and this
institutional adaptation increases societal resilience to future
hazards (Kaufman et al. 2016). However, this may also be at odds
with other literature that is skeptical about the “inevitable”
adaptation response. Some socio-environmental systems were
trapped in a feedback process where external triggers (such as
climate hazards) interacted with key system variables in
preventing the flexibility needed for adaptation (Cinner 2011,
Enfors 2013). Apart from these rigidity traps, it has been observed
that institutions are not automatically geared toward the goals of
coping or recovery, nor inevitably designed for conservation
purposes per se (Fabinyi et al. 2014). Moreover, institutions
devised to tackle one challenge may have unforeseen side-effects
(positive or negative) in other domains. In fact, some suggest that
institutions are to a large part the result of social bargaining or
even conflict, and intimately link up with the leverage and
positions of social actors. That being so, they may be formed and
manipulated by the interests and preferences of certain
individuals and social groups holding inequitable amounts of
power, resources, and social capital (Nee and Ingram 1998, Ogilvie
2007). In this paper, we examine to what extent environmental
hazards automatically lead to institutional adaptation, and if  not,
focus on some of the reasons why this may not be so.  
Overall, we provide two hypotheses. First, we suggest that
economic inequality, defined as unequal ownership or use of
resources, especially affects societal responses to hazards by
impacting upon the development and use of institutions. Second,
we suggest that institutional adaptation may not inevitably occur
in the aftermath of hazards, as a result of power asymmetries, or
more precisely, a mismatch between the broader needs for societal
resilience and the needs of a more select group with focused
interests. To test these hypotheses we focus on (a) inequality in
the distribution of resources, (b) formal water management
institutions, and (c) floods, all tested within the geographical and
temporal context of the preindustrial Low Countries (1250–
1800).
METHODS
We employ a historical approach. This allows us to discuss
temporal dimensions, including those in the very long run. The
relationships between inequality, institutions, and adaptation
discussed here developed over time, did not necessarily move in
one direction, and societal responses were often lengthy,
necessitating the use of the historical record (van Bavel and Curtis
2016, Rohland 2018). The historical record also offers a wide
variety in levels of inequality, institutional arrangements, social
characteristics, and flooding outcomes, which were often
importantly found at a regional level, sometimes even regions
close together subject to the same kinds of exogenous shock
(Curtis et al. 2016). The regions considered in this paper are not
so much defined by size or geography, but rather by their internal
coherence in socioeconomic, institutional, and environmental
features. This variety of configurations at the regional level hence
presents a suitable laboratory for developing and testing ideas at
the macrolevel over the long run (van Bavel 2015).  
This regional variety in institutional arrangements is particularly
evident in the field of water management in the preindustrial Low
Countries. In many coastal and riverine areas, water management
was organized by autonomous organizations or decision-making
bodies, organized along local or regional lines, which set the
formal rules and decided on the extent and nature of investments.
(Soens 2013a). Although decision-making processes were
sometimes very localized, i.e., organized per village or group of
villages, and sometimes centralized in supra-local water boards
covering 20 villages or more, such as the one founded in 1327 in
the Tielerwaard and Bommelerwaard in the Guelders river area
(Moorman van Kappen et al. 1977), major changes in the level
of investments, the inclusiveness of the decision-making process,
or the organization of funding generally showed significant
regional coherence (Soens 2011). Moreover, although central
political bodies existed at the supra-regional or state-level (van
Cruyningen 2014, van Tielhof 2015), they had limited influence
before 1800: the local/regional water management bodies were
decisive in supervision, taxation, and investment.  
Social characteristics in the preindustrial Low Countries also
varied sharply per region, even among neighboring regions (van
Bavel 2010). Each region had specific characteristics in its
distribution of property and resources, social relationships, and
constellations of institutions. Regional differences were
pronounced in the countryside, and more so than in the towns
where inter-regional interaction and convergence were more
apparent. Because water management organization was a rural
phenomenon, we employ the different institutional organization
of water management, extents of economic inequality, and
flooding outcomes, to better understand the effect of economic
inequality on the adaptive capacity of institutions to limit the
negative impact of hazards and shocks. Furthermore, the
temporal dimension allows us to identify any changes over time,
giving us a double opportunity for comparison: between regions
and across periods within regions.  
We analyze three regional rural societies where the threat of floods
was high over a long period to identify different phases in the
interaction between material inequality, institutions, and floods
(Fig. 1). All over the North Sea area the social-ecological
transformation of coastal wetlands from extensively used
floodplains into settled landscapes set in around 1000 CE and
had been more or less completed by the moment we start our
analysis in 1250 CE (Rippon 2000). From the moment coastal
wetlands were reclaimed through the construction of sea-walls or
dikes they became vulnerable to dike breaches and floods, which
usually were triggered by storm surges, combinations of severe
storm conditions and high tides. Although some periods
witnessed a higher frequency and intensity of storm surges than
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Fig. 1. Map of the Low Countries indicating the three regions. Iason Jongepier, GIStorical
Antwerp (UAntwerpen/Hercules Foundation).
others, related to changes in atmospheric patterns over the North
Atlantic (Dangendorf et al. 2014, Suursaar et al. 2015, Degroot
2018), no causal link between variations in storminess and the
chronology and geography of coastal floods can be established
(de Kraker 2013). Likewise, a meticulous reconstruction of water
discharge quantities of the River Rhine at Basel from 1268
onward (Wetter at al. 2011), indicative of the hazard posed to the
lower basin of the River Rhine, does not correspond to the
occurrence of large floods in the lower regions. Although floods
were triggered by major storm surges or large water discharges,
not every major storm surge or peak discharge produced a flood.
So although we cannot control exactly for the occurrence of storm
surges or rainfall and the deeper environmental dynamics
underlying these surges, significant variations in the occurrence
and intensity of floods that were unrelated to chronologies of
storminess or water tables suggest that societal factors had an
important role to play.  
We have selected societies where significant changes occurred in
inequality or the institutional organization of water management
and where we have sources available to reconstruct these. The
three societies in the Low Countries include (a) Coastal Flanders,
1250–1570, (b) the Guelders River Area, 1400–1700, and (c)
Northern Groningen, 1500–1800. For each of the three cases we
analyze changes in inequality, the institutional organization of
water management, and flooding outcomes.  
We make the reconstructions on the basis of secondary published
material for each case, supplemented by additional primary
source research. For economic inequality, we measure the
distribution of land because this was the most important
production factor and wealth component in Northwest European
preindustrial rural societies. Fortunately, this is also best
documented because taxation was mostly levied on land and left
most traces in the sources. Indeed, the main primary sources used
include fiscal documents and property registers such as lease
books, which for these three societies are relatively abundant and
accessible, and therefore another reason to select these three
cases.  
We measure inequality both for the ownership of the land (the
distribution of land over the owners) and the access to the use of
the land (the distribution of land over the users). Because
substantial shares of the land were leased out, and thus could be
accumulated or fragmented through the lease market, distribution
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at the user level could differ from that at the ownership level. We
measure land ownership as changes in the percentages distributed
between different social groups (the aristocracy, urban burghers,
farmers, and peasants); that is to say an increased proportion of
property moving out of the hands of local peasants and into the
hands of absentee urban burghers is an indication of heightening
inequality. For land use within the rural communities, the sources
allow us to calculate Gini coefficients property distribution at the
user level, which range historically in late-medieval and early
modern Western Europe from lows of roughly 0.4 to highs of
roughly 0.9 (Curtis 2014a). Of course, each source for each region
has its own idiosyncrasies, which mean that it is difficult to
compare inequality levels between regions in any absolute terms.
Whereas in Groningen the fiscal records are measuring
distribution of land farmed by all users (whether they are direct
owners or tenants), the data we have for the Guelders river area
mostly relates only to distribution of land between lease tenants,
and we cannot fully compare the two. We accept this, and instead
use the Gini coefficients as relative indicators, measuring changes
in distribution of land in the individual regions themselves over
time (for the same approach employed in other recent historical
studies on long-term changes in inequality, see Alfani and
Ammannati 2017). Although the Gini mainly measures extremes
(rather than middling groups), this is appropriate for our purposes
because we are mainly interested in the effects of pronounced
polarization. Overall, we try to keep the same unit of
measurement across time, however because of historical source
limitations, sometimes the inequality figures come from the whole
region under study, but sometimes (especially for earlier periods)
from a subsample of the region, i.e., some villages within the
region. Finally, it must be noted also that although these sources
do not record the landless, the fiscal records at least register those
people who had a tiny plot, just large enough for a small cottage
or hut and garden. The proportion of people who did not even
have a small plot for a residence, however meagre, was likely very
small, and thus accordingly, the proportion of people not
accounted for is also small.  
The reconstruction of the institutions for water management is
more straightforward and occurs through piecing together
information from an assortment of account books and statutes
from water boards. The Low Countries offer some of the world’s
oldest continuous series of account books related to flood
protection and drainage, starting as early as the late 13th century.
Investments related to the upkeep of the water management
infrastructure were substantial, and could vary from five to more
than 30% of the annual income from land (Soens 2011). The same
sources, complemented by statutes, legal proceedings (lawsuits),
and, from the 16th century onward, minutes of meetings, also
provide data on the decision-making process, for instance
allowing us to investigate the rotation and social background of
office-holders as proxy for the inclusiveness of the decision-
making process (Brusse 2018).  
Finally, we measure the outcome variable as the severity of the
flooding. To begin with, we use chronicles and other forms of
administrative documents to simply reconstruct the incidence of
flood events. Our task here is aided by the extremely detailed
archival work already created on the subject, where a three-
volume gazetteer was produced, practically reconstructing every
single flood ever to have occurred in the preindustrial Low
Countries (Gottschalk 1971, 1975, 1977, revised and
supplemented by Buisman 1995-2015). However detailed these
gazetteers might be, they do not allow for a simple quantification
of flood frequency: on the one hand the records clearly are less
abundant before 1400 than after, on the other hand, more
localized flood problems might be recorded in one case, but
omitted in another. Moreover, the simple occurrence or frequency
of a flood is also insufficient in itself  to determine whether a
certain social-ecological arrangement lacked resilience qualities
or not. Indeed, throughout history there are many examples of
societies that faced periodic flood episodes without major social,
economic, or political disruption (Endfield 2012), or even
benefitted from floods, as, for example, in using deposited
sediment as fertilizer (Smith 2014). Accordingly, we also account
for the different harmful effects of the flood in question. The first
marker we use is number of casualties. Generally speaking,
preindustrial and modern floods in northwest Europe have very
low mortality effects (Soens 2018), and thus any flood that did
produce high casualties, can automatically be considered as
severe. By this we assess any floods as severe if  they produced
more than 500 casualties in the whole area under investigation
(given that only a few floods have ever produced more than 1000
total casualties in the whole of the North Sea area: Jakubowski-
Tiessen 1992, Buisman 2015), or if  within a locality in the area,
there was a mortality rate of more than 20% of the resident
population (and therefore over the same threshold determining a
severe preindustrial epidemic or famine: Alfani and Ó Gráda
2017). Quantifiable figures are possible for many of the early
modern floods, and from the 17th century onward, much more
specific mortality information for certain localities can be
provided through burial registers, which allow us to place flood
casualties in relation to normal numbers of deaths. However, for
the medieval period in particular, but also some of the early
modern floods, information on casualties is either missing or
subject to inaccuracy and unreliability (Curtis 2014a).
Accordingly, our second indicator for severity of a flood episode
is measured through the impact on the most important production
factor in these preindustrial societies: land. More specifically, we
look at loss of land, land falling into a state of disuse, land no
longer able to be intensively used, or loss of capital goods and
infrastructure needed to work the land. This information can
never be fully complete because we are dependent on the
availability of sources, but we have used all relevant and accessible
information from an assortment of documentary source material
including chronicles and narrative observations, state resolutions,
and water board petitions. It must be noted that this indicator of
land loss and capital damage does not always mean the same thing
between different historical societies, e.g., the repercussions of
100 hectares loss via flooding in one region is not always
equivalent to the same 100 hectares loss elsewhere, and thus this
indicator is only compared temporally within the same region
rather than between regions. Overall then, all of the above allows
us to assess flood periods in four categories: infrequent low
severity, frequent low severity, infrequent high severity, and
frequent high severity.
RESULTS
Coastal Flanders, 1250–1570
The Flemish coastal plain, which geographically stretches from
Calais in Northern France over the Belgian coast to Zeelandic
Flanders (today part of the Netherlands; Fig. 2), was largely
Ecology and Society 23(4): 30
https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol23/iss4/art30/
Fig. 2. Map of coastal Flanders, indicating the localities mentioned in the text. Iason Jongepier,
GIStorical Antwerp (UAntwerpen/Hercules Foundation)
reclaimed between the 10th and the 13th centuries, when the
previous strategy of living on higher lands or raised mouths and
concentrating on animal husbandry was abandoned in favor of
permanent embankment and drainage (Soens et al. 2014). Most
of the area was situated above mean high water, but remained
liable to flooding due to periodic storm surges, the human-
induced erosion of the old dune barrier protecting the coast, and
the shrinkage of the peat soils in the interior parts of the coastal
plain.
1250–1350: Low but rising inequality in landownership and land
use, institutional adaptation, unknown frequency, low severity
flooding
The initial reclamation of the area was probably initiated by
communities of free peasant farmers. From the 11th century
onward, however, common salt marshes near tidal channels were
increasingly appropriated by the Count of Flanders, who donated
parts to ecclesiastical institutions and noble families. Settlers were
attracted by favorable conditions of tenure, including personal
freedoms and political autonomy (Tys 2013). In the 12th and 13th
centuries Coastal Flanders witnessed remarkable economic and
demographic growth in conditions of relative equality, with
nonspecialized smallholders engaging in proto-industrial and
para-agrarian activities such as fishing and salt extraction. By the
13th century, the coastal plain was inhabited by landowning
peasant smallholders. In 1227 for instance, the polder of
Stoppeldijk (694.5 hectares of land) was owned by 172 local
landowners, owning on average four hectares of land each. Only
three local noblemen owned more substantial plots of land
(between 25 and 40 hectares each; Soens 2009). In contrast, the
13th century saw a pronounced rise in inequality of
landownership resulting from peasant expropriation and land
grabbing by bourgeois, noble, and monastic landowners: the first
surveys of landownership dating from the late 14th century
indicate that 40 to 45% of the land north of Bruges was owned
by these absentee landowners (Soens 2009), and much of this land
was acquired from the local peasantry between 1250 and 1350, as
documented by a huge number of land transfers (sales, gifts, and
confiscations) dating back to this period. (Soens and Thoen 2008).
In some cases whole districts (polders) were sold by their former
peasant landowners, including the already mentioned polder of
Stoppeldijk, which in 1227 was sold by its 172 landowners to one
single owner: the Cistercian Abbey of Cambron. At the user level,
we see a polarization of land use, with on the one hand some land
turned into larger farmsteads, and on the other increasing
pressure on the market for small plots of land. The multiplication
of these microholdings (below one hectare) resulted in high
inequality of land use already around 1300 (with for instance a
Gini coefficient for the distribution of lease land of 0.63 among
the 88 tenants on the Zuienkerke-estate of St John’s Hospital in
Bruges in 1310; own calculation based on Appendix in Vervaet
2015).  
The organization of coastal flood protection was gradually
adapted to these changes in economic inequality. Starting in the
surroundings of the city of Bruges, the commercial gateway of
late-medieval Flanders, maintenance shifted from individual
landowners to specific local authorities, the water boards, which
hired labor and levied a monetary tax proportional to the land
owned to finance their activities. By the end of the 13th century
coastal flood protection in Flanders had been monetized, a radical
institutional transformation that allowed the rapid mobilization
of capital after floods and adapted coastal water management to
a new social situation in which absentee landowners controlled a
large part of the land (Soens 2009, 2011). Whether these
institutional changes were linked to any particular flood episode
is uncertain: Gottschalk (1971) mentions seven flood episodes in
this period, but this is probably an understatement (Galloway
2009). In any case, the highly adaptable water governance of this
period was rather successful in preventing storm surges turning
into full-blown flood disasters. The so-called Clemens Flood of
23 November 1334 caused dike breaches all over the Flemish
North Sea Coast and the Scheldt Estuary, but the damage was
swiftly repaired, including adapted organization of settlements,
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for instance, in the town of Ostend where the church was relocated
to a higher place (Augustyn 1992). Notwithstanding difficult
political and economic circumstances that included Franco-
Flemish warfare, the Great Famine of 1315–1317, and the Peasant
Revolt of 1323–1328 (TeBrake 1993), overall land losses remained
limited.
1350–1425: Stable inequality of landownership but decreasing
inequality of land use, institutions not adapted, frequent high
severity flooding
After the population decline caused by the Black Death and
recurring plagues, Coastal Flanders experienced a reduction in
the number of microholdings (smaller than 1 hectare), but an
increase in smallholdings (3–5 hectares) and middle-sized
holdings (5–15 hectares). With a Gini coefficient of 0.55 in 1369
(compared to 0.63 in 1310) and a median landholding of 1.16
hectares (compared to 0.76 in 1310), the inequality of land use
on the above mentioned estate in Zuienkerke was clearly
decreasing (own calculation based on Appendix in Vervaet 2015).
Real wages for both skilled and unskilled workers increased
considerably in the post-Black Death period, and this rise was
more pronounced in the coastal plain than in other parts of
Flanders (Thoen and Soens 2015). As coastal agriculture
remained labor-intensive, demand for labor was high, resulting in
a true golden age for wage labor, lasting until the 1420s (Geens
and Soens 2017, unpublished manuscript). Fiscal data from the
latter decade, mainly based on the income from land, and hence
reflecting inequality of land use, testify to a relatively equal society
(a Gini coefficient of 0.42 in the village of Zuienkerke in 1425;
Dombrecht and Ryckbosch 2017). In contrast, the allocation of
landownership remained more stable: the gains made by large
absentee landowners in the previous period were consolidated,
but no longer expanded, meaning that 50 to 60% of the land was
still owned by the local peasantry (Soens 2009).  
In Coastal Flanders, this post-Black Death period was
characterized by several devastating storm surges (14 according
to Gottschalk 1971) and at least two of them can be classified as
very severe following our criteria. Although the number of
casualties probably remained limited (Soens 2018), the storm
surges of 8 to 10 October 1375 and 19 November 1404 resulted
in major land losses, which could not be undone over the next
decades. The floods of 1391 and 1424 resulted in more localized
land losses. In 1408, the permanent land losses along the Flemish
North Sea coast between Nieuwpoort and Kadzand already
totaled 3025 hectares, as estimated by officials of the Count of
Flanders, and included both submerged lands and lands destroyed
by inland drifting sand dunes (Augustyn 1992). In the Western
Scheldt Estuary, a new tidal inlet was created, the Braakman,
leading to the permanent loss of at least 10 parishes (Gottschalk
1975). In reaction to these repeated flood disasters, Flemish water
boards showed little sign of adaptation: they tried to absorb
floods in exactly the same way as before, investing large amounts
of money, used to hire large numbers of laborers (Soens 2011).
Although wages were higher after the Black Death, the financial
cost of not adapting was also high. This burden of taxation
eventually proved problematic for the remaining landowning
peasantry, who had to pay taxes with the profit of their marketable
surpluses in a period when food prices were low. The changed
social conditions of the post-Black Death period required a return
to maintenance based on labor duties, rather than sticking to the
monetized system introduced in the late 13th century. Although
the coastal peasantry still enjoyed some form of access to the
decision-making process (Soens 2009), they lacked the kind of
political leverage needed to force major institutional adaptations
upon the absentee landowners.
1425–1570: Increasing inequality of landownership and land use,
limited institutional adaptations, frequent low severity flooding
Between 1425 and 1550 a massive transfer of landed property
took place from the peasant population to absentee landlords.
The urban bourgeoisie as well as the nobility and ecclesiastical
landlords, which in Flanders also were predominantly town-
based, saw their combined share in the ownership of coastal land
increase from 30 to 40% around 1300 and 1400 to 60 to 70%
around 1550 (Soens 2009, Dombrecht and Ryckbosch 2017). This
produced a constant flow of rent from the coastal wetlands to the
city, further sharpening the material inequalities between an
increasingly landless farming population and mostly absentee
landlords. At the same time, land use went through a process of
engrossment, with large farms (above 20 hectares) now controlling
70% of the land or more (for instance in the village of Oostkerke
in 1570, Soens 2009). Because this was paralleled by a further
decline in the number of microholdings, the Gini coefficient for
the distribution of lease land did not change much (0.54 to 0.56
on the above mentioned estate of St John’s Hospital in
Zuienkerke; own calculation based on Vervaet 2015). However,
these data exclude the growing number of landless laborers and
cottagers only renting a house and garden. Only for
Hulsterambacht in the north of Coastal Flanders, is a more
comprehensive overview of land use, including cottagers and
landless laborers, available. A Gini-coefficient of 0.66 among the
1233 land users in the area around 1570 clearly confirms a rising
polarization of land use (own calculation based on Nijenhuis
1992).  
The organization of flood protection in Coastal Flanders did not
witness fundamental changes. However, as peasant landownership
gradually declined, large landlords consolidated their grip on the
water boards, effectively ending the long tradition of inclusive
decision making in coastal water management. From the
mid-15th century onward, landlords opted for austerity by
reducing expenditure on flood protection to increase the financial
return on their land (Soens 2011). Although dike breaches were
frequent (Gottschalk 1975 records 35 floods in this period), the
emphasis on cost-efficiency initially succeeded in preventing these
floods from turning into severe flood disasters: after 1425, coastal
Flanders witnessed few permanent land losses. Only in 1488, seven
parishes were permanently flooded in the Braakman area,
resulting in a land loss of between 11,000 and 13,000 hectares,
but this land loss is widely attributed to the civil war ravaging
Flanders from 1488 to 1492, resulting both in deliberate, so-called
strategic inundations and a delay in the repair of relatively minor
breaches (de Kraker 1997). Flood problems gradually increased
in the 16th century, with supra-local floods in 1509, 1511, 1530,
1532, 1552, and 1570. The death count of these floods remained
limited, in contrast to other regions like Northern Groningen in
1570. For 1509 and 1511, de Kraker (2015) estimated that about
10% of the Zwin region north of Bruges was flooded, but hardly
any land was permanently lost to the sea. In 1530–1532 about
14,500 hectares were flooded east of the Braakman, but again
only 8 or 9% of the land could not be recovered immediately (de
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Fig. 3. Map of the Guelders river area, indicating the localities mentioned in the text. Iason
Jongepier, GIStorical Antwerp (UAntwerpen/Hercules Foundation)
Kraker 1997), mainly thanks to the influx of merchant capital
from the booming metropolis of Antwerp (Dekker and Baetens
2010). By this time, however, there was a clear feeling that austerity
policies had reached their limits: there were widespread calls to
change the localized funding mechanisms of flood protection,
and enforce the solidarity of a wider hinterland with areas
threatened by floods. This only succeeded in a limited number of
cases, triggered by a major flood—Kadzand after 1530–1532 and
the Zes Everingen after 1552—and the direct intervention of the
Habsburg Monarchy (de Kraker 1997, van Tielhof 2015). Overall,
however, the vested financial interests of large landlords worked
against major institutional reforms toward broader financial
solidarity (Soens 2013b). Although floods were not particularly
severe in terms of permanent land losses or casualties, they did
reinforce inequality: with every flood more land was transferred
from local landowners to absentee investors (Dekker and Baetens
2010).
Guelders river area, 1400–1700
This area was continuously exposed to the hazard of flooding
because it was crossed by three large rivers (Fig. 3) and most land
was low-lying, even more so as the drainage of agricultural land
from the 11th century had led to soil subsidence. Risk was further
intensified by diking, leading to sedimentation and ever higher-
lying rivers, especially when the dikes were fully completed in the
late-13th century. This increased the chances and severity of dike
breaks and floods, and problems with the seepage of water made
it a risk-prone area.
1400–1440: High inequality of landownership and relative
equality of land use, changing institutions, frequent high severity
flooding
The region had almost no independent small-scale peasant
landowners because it had been dominated by the large estates of
noble and monastic owners since the early Middle Ages. About
four-fifths of the land was, and remained, owned by a small
number of noblemen and religious houses and the region was thus
characterized by high inequality at the ownership level (van Bavel
1999). These large estates in their turn were divided up into smaller
parcels and leased out for short terms from the 14th century
onward in a competitive lease market. In the first half  of the 15th
century, this lease land was still distributed broadly between
tenants with family-sized farms, thus creating a relative equality
at the land-user level, as most people had access to a family-farm,
even if  they were not owners.  
Whereas earlier water management was organized by local
communities, the linking of dike systems around 1300 required
supra-local cooperation and invited top-down interference by the
Count of Guelders, although local communities and lords still
played major roles (Moorman van Kappen et al. 1977). Around
1400, this institutional organization was rearranged.
Maintenance was divided between the villages, who now became
responsible themselves for the division of tasks between
individuals, with specific sections of the dike allocated to the
owners of specific parcels (Moorman van Kappen et al. 1977). In
this period, however, many of these individuals abandoned their
parcels burdened with diking duties, leading to increasingly
dangerous situations. In reaction to this, in the period 1410–1414,
the duties were made common: that is the local water management
authorities decided on maintenance, and costs were divided
between landowners according to the size of their estate in the
area protected by the dike. This led to a monetization of water
management duties, which pressurized landowners interested in
keeping costs down.  
Documentary evidence to reconstruct the incidence of floods is
scarce in the 14th century, but becomes richer from the closing
decades of that century. Still, not a single river flood in the area
is recorded. The period 1400–1440, on the other hand, saw various
floods recorded by chroniclers, who tended to reflect on their
severe nature (in 1409, 1413, 1432, 1433, and 1438; Gottschalk
1975, Kuys et al. 1983). After the breach of the dikes along the
river Waal in 1432, destroying the sown winter grain, dikes broke
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again in the winter of 1433, flooding the whole region. The water
was so high that people had to take refuge on the tops of their
houses, where many died of cold or hunger (Buisman 1996 Vol.
II). The large landowning abbey of Mariënweerd lost most of
their winter grain when the Linge dike broke, and lower-lying
areas reclaimed from the marshes stayed under water for
consecutive years in the 1430s (Curtis 2014a). In 1437, again, the
dikes along the Waal broke three times, causing destruction, also
of capital goods, including the stoned ovens of the town of
Culemborg[1]. This period thus stands out for the severity of
floods, indicating that the changes in institutional arrangement
either misfired or led to transitional problems.
1440–1520: Stable high inequality of landownership and stable
distribution of land use, stable institutions, infrequent low severity
flooding
In this societal context, the distribution of landownership and
land use did not change much. Most land remained in the
ownership of the same large landlords, while most of the farms
continued to be leased by family farmers and remained composed
of a scattered patchwork of smaller plots. In 1456, the Gini
coefficient for distribution of lease land was 0.74 in the western
part of the Guelders river area (Curtis 2014a): rather unequal for
distribution at the land-use level but relatively equal compared to
the distribution of landownership and compared to the
distribution at the land-use level later in the 16th century. The
institutional organization of water management underwent no
changes in the period. Parts of the duties were performed by the
tenants of the family farms in the form of labor, and other parts
in money paid by tenants and landlords.  
Whereas the previous period was characterized by massive floods,
this period was a lengthy phase with only a few floods up to c.1520.
Despite the full and extensive documentary evidence for this
period, including that of several very detailed chronicles for the
area, only five dike breaches leading to flooding are recorded in
this 80-year period: in 1469, 1486, 1497, 1511, and 1519
(Gottschalk1975). They do not appear to have had any significant
impact on land, capital goods, and production, but only caused
some temporary nuisance and required some labor and
investment to repair dikes, as from the burghers of Nijmegen in
1511, who had helped in repairing the dike on the river Waal and
were rewarded with six barrels of beer. The low frequency of
floods and their minor severity reflects a well-functioning mixed
system of water management (owner/tenant; money/labor; local/
regional) within a stable societal and environmental context. The
fact that the system performed well suggests retroactively that the
major flood incidence of the previous period was due to
transitional problems, and not fundamental ones.
1520–1560: Stable high inequality of landownership and growing
inequality of land use, no adaption of institutions, frequent low
severity flooding
In this period, the Guelders river area underwent a conspicuous
process of rising inequality; not at the landownership level, where
the distribution had always been highly unequal, but at the land-
user level. In a process accelerating in the 16th century, the sharp
competition in lease markets and in output markets gave rise to
a small group of large tenant farmers who accumulated lease land,
formed large capital-intensive farms, and pushed small- and
medium-scale tenants out of the market. About 40% of the land
came into the hands of farmers using 30 hectares of land or more,
while these large farms had been virtually absent before (van Bavel
2001, Curtis 2014a). Whereas in 1456 the distribution of tenant
land in the western part of the Guelders river area had a Gini
coefficient of 0.74, in 1550 it had risen to 0.85 (Curtis 2014a).
These farms focused on extensive pastoral farming, while
medium-sized farms that had previously focused on arable
agriculture disappeared.  
Institutional arrangements were not adapted in this period. Their
effects, however, did change as a result of rising inequality. As
small-scale tenants disappeared, water management became more
monetized, with many labor duties replaced by payments in
money, used for hiring wage laborers. The costs were mainly
shifted from landowners to tenants by way of stipulations in the
lease contracts, with sharp competition for lease land forcing
tenants to accept the terms. The few remaining small-scale
tenants, often in financial trouble, became burdened with very
onerous labor tasks and were made responsible for relatively large
tracts of the dike. Also, in this now fully market-oriented
environment, in which neither tenants nor wage laborers had any
say in decisions on water management, the large landowners
decided themselves on investments and regular maintenance with
an eye on profit margins. This led to increasing focus on
investments in watermills for drainage purposes, as this pushed
up productivity, and a neglected construction and renovation of
dikes. Around 1520, a special tax for tenants was introduced to
finance drainage mills, with the tax rate doubled in 1532 and again
raised by half  in 1559 (van Bavel 1993).  
In the context of growing inequality, floods returned again. These
floods were not catastrophic or permanent land losses, but they
were serious, and their large number is especially striking, with
no fewer than 10 serious ones in this 40-year period. The largest
landowner in the region, the Abbot of Mariënweerd, noted heavy
damage following a large flood in February 1551, with the land
under several meters of water, but damage became even greater
when the water returned in May of the same year, rendering it
impossible for the farmers to graze their cattle and sow their lands.
The severe impact is reflected in the fact that the abbot granted
the tenants reductions of half  or even the whole lease sum
(Gottschalk 1975, van Bavel 1993). This flood was exceptional in
its impact, but the number of floods in this period was large.  
Floods and semipermanent problems with water contributed to
growing inequality at the land-user level as a feedback loop. First,
it contributed to the growing precariousness of small-scale
tenants, together with the ravages brought by war, as evidenced
by their increasing indebtedness around the middle of the 16th
century (van Bavel 1993). Second, it made intensive arable
agriculture impossible in large parts, contributing to a
development toward extensive forms of animal husbandry, most
notably breeding of horses and fattening of oxen (van Bavel 2001).
These sectors were capital-intensive, required capital reserves and
solid links to financial and output markets, and required very little
labor, thus exacerbating the problems of small-scale tenants and
reinforcing the position of large-scale wealthy tenants. These were
also the ones, conjointly with the large landowners, who
dominated decisions on water management and did not have an
incentive to fundamentally adapt the institutions of water
management.
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Fig. 4. Map of Northern Groningen, indicating the localities mentioned in the text. Iason
Jongepier, GIStorical Antwerp (UAntwerpen/Hercules Foundation)
1560–1700: Stable high inequality of landownership and land use,
hardly changing institutions, frequent high severity flooding
Around 1600, land remained highly unequally distributed, both
in landownership, as it had always been, and now also at the user
level, apart from small pockets of small-scale farming (Brusse
2018). Also around 1600, central authorities attempted to replace
local and regional rules and customs in water management by a
more centralized regulatory system (Moorman van Kappen et al.
1977). These attempts largely failed, as a result of local
communities and lords clinging to their traditional roles. As the
necessity of cooperating in large investments increased, this
increasingly became problematic, as particularistic tendencies
prevailed. Within this institutional system, the weight of money
payments quickly increased from c.1560. As a share of the total
lease revenue, water management costs doubled in this period (van
Bavel 1993). As a result, and combined with the negative effects
on the local economy, the existing institutional option of
abandoning a parcel with diking duties now proved problematic
as the growing incidence of floods in a feedback loop reduced the
profitability of farming and resulted in a growing number of
vacant parcels, which further increased pressure on the remaining
tax base.  
This situation had a negative effect on the incidence of floods,
which further increased in frequency and intensity in the 1570s
and remained at a high level across the whole of the 17th century.
There were floods in 1565, 1570–1571, 1587, and 1595, and many
of these were serious. The flood of 1570, for instance, not only
drowned large tracts of land, but also destroyed watermills, dikes,
quays, and bridges (Gottschalk 1975). The series of floods
continued in the 17th century, with no fewer than seven floods in
the opening decades, followed by a catastrophic flood in January
and February 1624. Following this event, there were continuing
floods in the following decades. Also, the land increasingly
suffered from the increasing nuisance of seeping that now became
almost semipermanent and was turned over to very extensive use
(Brusse 1999), to be characterized here as a form of land loss. In
1650 tax records noted that many lower-lying lands spent long
periods under water in the winter (Curtis 2014a). All this suggests
that the organization of water management was not fit for a
context of high inequality at both the owner and the user level,
and the effects were detrimental to resilience as a result of a
negative feedback loop between these elements. Despite the
evident severity of the floods, however, the rules of water
management were not adapted. The decision-making power of
large landlords and local communities dominated by large-scale
tenant farmers and middling landowners, who had most interest
in the existing arrangements, and whose position was buttressed
by their economic dominance, could not be broken by either
central authorities or small landowners and small tenants, with
these last groups being hit hardest by the severe floods.
Northern Groningen, 1500–1800
Northern Groningen, as the northernmost point of the
Netherlands and comprising the two historic regions of Hunsingo
and Fivelgo, is a coastal region lining the Wadden Sea (Fig. 4).
Problems with storm surges were identified as far back as the early
Middle Ages, when communities raised their houses or even whole
villages on artificial mounds (terpen). As more land became
reclaimed closer to the sea for habitation and agriculture, there
was even greater need for protection via networks of dikes, ditches,
and mills. This area then remained at risk of inundation through
floods caused by storm surges.
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1500–1635: Low inequality of landownership and relative
equality in land use, unchanged institutions, frequent low severity
flooding
Prior to the 17th century, limited sources we have at our disposal
suggest a relatively equitable society of free peasant farmers who
owned their own land, with weak traditions of feudalism and
absentee overlordship (Knottnerus 2013). Urban landlords had
yet to invest to a large degree in rural landownership in Northern
Groningen. Jaartaxen (simpler precursors for the later
verpondingen) for individual scattered parishes in the second half
of the 15th century and in the 16th century also suggest high
equality in distribution of land use with low Gini coefficients
around 0.5 (Curtis 2016a). In 1630, the date of the earliest fiscal
land register for whole region of Groningen (verponding), the Gini
coefficient for both regions of Hunsingo and Fivelgo was still
only around 0.59 (Curtis 2016a).  
Medieval water management in Groningen was largely based
around a localized organization of water boards, which continued
into the 16th and 17th centuries (Ligtendag 1995). These water
boards employed a Kabeldeichung system, where each peasant
farmer had individual responsibility for making the necessary
flood defenses according to their landholding.  
In some parts of Groningen, such as in the east in the Oldambt
and Reiderland, water management was badly compromised by
tribal colonist conflict (Knottnerus 2013). After the Cosmas- and
Damianus Flood, which created the Dollard Sea in 1509, there
were at least 11 separate flood events from 1554–1597 in the
Oldambt, the most serious being the All Saints Flood of 1570,
which left arable fields submerged for months afterward (Vermue
2012). However, it appears that the Kabeldeichung system was
much more effective in Northern Groningen (Knottnerus 2013).
For example, while in other parts of the North Sea area, the flood
of 1570 created hundreds of casualties (Homeier 1970,
Rheinheimer 2003), there is little evidence that substantial deaths
occurred in the regions of Hunsingo and Fivelgo (Rienks and
Rienst-Wallinga 1970). In 1634, the Burchardi Flood created
significant casualties in the neighboring northern areas of North
Frisia and Dithmarschen, and yet from the few burial records we
have for villages in Northern Groningen (Westeremden and
Garnswerd), no mortality effect can be discerned at all, the only
exception being the Oldambt village of Midwolda, and this was
attributed to a localized outbreak of smallpox instead (burials
database used in Curtis 2016b). Overall then, although Gottschalk
noted 32 flood events in the period 1500–1634 in Groningen
(1975), most of these were localized and not particularly
damaging, and the most severe ones, such as that of 1509, afflicted
other areas outside Northern Groningen.
1635–1725: Rising inequality in landownership and rising
inequality in land use, unchanged institutions, infrequent high
severity flooding
Changes occurred in the distribution of property during the 17th
century. In large parts of the province, land was increasingly
shifted out of the hands of local peasant farmers and consolidated
more with elite landowners, often urban institutions and wealthy
burghers from Groningen city (Hoppenbrouwers 1991, Curtis
2016a). In nearby Oldambt, only a third of the land was left in
the hands of rural inhabitants by 1721 (Curtis 2014b), and in other
parts of inland clay-soil areas it was as low as a quarter (Paping
1995). In the regions of Hunsingo and Fivelgo, the Gini coefficient
for user-level property distribution moved from 0.59 (in both
areas) in 1630 to 0.68 and 0.71, respectively, in 1721 (Curtis
2016a). These increases in Gini coefficients must also be taken as
an absolute minimum given that the fiscal sources fail to record
the increasing proportions of landless.  
Although from the 16th and particularly 17th century onward the
city of Groningen began to accumulate land and bring rural areas
into its jurisdictional sphere, it did little to invest in the protection
of this land from water, with the exception of urban-financed
dikes draining the fenlands and connecting canals to Westfalen
('t Hart 1998). The city remained exempt from dike maintenance
costs until the second half  of the 17th century, and even then,
only partial contributions were made. In 1686 during the St.
Martin’s Flood, Groningen did give partial assistance (Ufkes
1984), though during the Christmas Floods of 1717, the city once
again retreated from an active role (Sundberg 2015). Across the
17th century then, we see increasing consolidation of property
and jurisdiction by absentee elites, yet very minimal investments
or contribution from the same parties in water management.
Urban landowners continued to maintain the principles of the
medieval Kabeldeichung system, urging their tenants instead to
make necessary capital and labor contributions. Even after the
disastrous Christmas Flood of 1717, the provincial committee
noted in a resolution that it was the responsibility of farmers
allocated to a specific portion of the dike to make repairs
(Sundberg 2015), yet when agricultural prices dropped post-1650,
it was impossible for tenants to make those investments,
particularly given that prior abandonment of smallholdings left
remaining farmers responsible for 10 or more parts of a dike. The
clear threat and direct experience of floods in Northern
Groningen failed to stimulate any kind of institutional
adaptation.  
This flooding situation in Hunsingo and Fivelingo therefore
changed during the second half  of the 17th century, with the
terrible St. Martin’s Flood of 1686, killing approximately 1900
people (1600 in Groningen province). The village of Termunten
in 1686 recorded 223 dead during the St. Martin’s Flood (53 noted
explicitly as bodies fished out of the water), when the usual annual
burial rate was around 25 (burials database used in Curtis 2016b).
If  we estimate a death rate of around 4% of the population in
normal times (for 17th-century Groningen; Schroor 2014), this
may have been around 40% of the population. Moreover, out of
more than 450 localities in a recently compiled 17th-century
burials database, with mortality data for more than 22,000
individual years, the relative increase in burials in Termunten in
1686 was third out of c.22,000, comparable to the most severe
epidemics (burials database used in van Besouw and Curtis 2018).
Similarly, the nearby village of Woldendorp in 1686 was ranked
101 out of c.22,000. Following this, the Christmas Flood of 1717
killed around 2300 people and 35,000 animals in Groningen
province, leaving dikes not only broken but completely submerged
(Sundberg 2015). Many of those who died were poor laborers,
while wealthier farmers tended to survive (Paping 2017, Soens
2018). Essentially all of Northern Groningen was affected in 1717
(as seen from shaded area of the map in Fig. 5). The scale of
destruction then completely overshadowed any minor localized
floods that came before or after this period.  
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Fig. 5. Detail from Geographische Vorstellung der jämerlichen Wasser-Flutt in Nieder-Teutschland, edit von
Joh. Bapt. Homann, Der Röm. Keis. Mai. Georg. in Nürnberg, 1717, Groninger Archieven, Groningen
Given the obvious negative outcomes, the question then is why
the water management system failed to be adapted to suit the
changes in redistributive context? Why continue with the
principles of the medieval Kabeldeichung system, more suited to
a flat-hierarchy peasant society, when it was clear that most
elements of this peasant society were being eroded during the 17th
century? The alternative solution should have been investment
from the parties acquiring the property in the 17th century, that
is the wealthy urban burghers and powerful institutions from the
city of Groningen itself  who, instead of directly offering labor
assistance, should have provided the capital for waged labor
assistance. These wealthy urban groups, however, were reluctant
to invest in spite of their property acquisitions, and this can be
explained by the historic tensions between the city and the so-
called provincial administration, or Ommelanden (Sundberg
2015), and exacerbated further by rural regions asserting their
autonomy (Curtis 2014b). Both the city and the provincial
administrations selectively invoked past precedents and customs
as a way of avoiding the onerous weight of the financial burden
that water management now bore, and when each saw the other
as the responsible party, they waited for each other to make the
first or more decisive commitment (Sundberg 2015). Even in times
of necessity then, as water management structures began to
clearly crumble (see the report of 1687 on the noted precarious
nature of the dikes: Groninger Archieven, Ommelander Archiven
1558-1862, no. 1084, fos 388-90), adaptation did not merely mirror
redistributive changes, and nor was adaptation an inevitable
consequence of increased flooding, but instead was dependent on
socio-political context.
Post-1725: Continued high inequality in landownership and rising
inequality in land use, changing institutions, infrequent low
severity flooding
After the Christmas Flood of 1717, land changed hands
frequently; between 1717 and 1721 on province-owned lands,
around 30–35% of holdings changed hands between tenants,
whereas in normal times it was annually less than 2% in many
parts of the early modern Netherlands (van Bavel 2004). Land
consolidation at the user level was initially limited, however,
because land value and prices of agricultural products were so
low that no incentives existed to do so (Knottnerus 2004).
Unrelated to the floods, only after 1750 do we see the return of
increased inequality in land use, this time to an excessive degree
as we witness the emergence of the classic polarized society of
gentleman farmers with large landholdings and agricultural
laborers who were almost landless in Groningen (Curtis 2014b),
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Fig. 6. Analytical framework that links the exogenous hazard of water surges to institutions
embedded in their socio-political context (with levels of equality as a main characteristic) and
outcomes (flood disaster or not), with a suggested feedback loop leading back to institutions
(adaptation or rigidity).
where in the Oldambt, for example, Gini coefficients for property
distribution were in excess of 0.85 by 1821, and were likely similar
in Hunsingo and Fivelgo, given the exact same farmer-laborer
structure had emerged in Northern Groningen in the second half
of the 18th century (Botke 2002).  
Whereas in the previous period (the 17th and early 18th centuries),
water management institutions remained rather rigid and
unsuited to the changing property distribution context, a key
difference in the later period after the Christmas Floods of 1717
was that changing tenurial conditions allowed tenant farmers to
more effectively involve themselves in the water management
institutions. Especially post-1750, tenant farmers exploited the
twin situation of a favorable system of beklemrecht (where land
rents were fixed over the long term) and rising agricultural prices
to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the real owners of the land,
so much so that many of these large farmers eventually became
outright owners (Knottnerus 2004). As a result, investment in all
the necessary water management structures became clearer and
farmers had a greater propensity to do so. Accordingly, although
the lack of adaptation in the previous period, in spite of severe
flood hazards, was connected to a stand-off between two
responsible parties of city and province, in a later period this
vacuum was circumvented by the emergence of a third party, the
rural tenant farmers themselves, who were now stronger than
before.  
It is no coincidence then that the adaptation of the institutional
framework surrounding water management to suit the changes in
the context for inequitable property distribution also occurred
along a similar chronology to the disappearance of severe
flooding outcomes in Groningen. The only exception to this was
the case of localized breaks in dikes around the city of Groningen
in 1825, the direct consequences being rather minor for mortality
and losses of production factors, but having indirect effects on
mortality as the rotting plants and animals in the morasses led to
an outbreak of malaria, killing 10% of the population (Baron
2006).
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed the interaction between economic
inequality and institutional adaptation in the face of flood
hazards. In doing so, we have used the frequency and severity of
floods in three flood-prone areas as an indicator of breakdown
in resilience. It is important to note that we first establish that
storm surges and high water tables are an exogenous variable but
the incidence of major floods, as an indicator of the level of
resilience of the region in question, is to a large extent caused by
societal qualities and the organization of water management
itself: more specifically by the degree to which the institutional
organization could be adapted to changing circumstances to cope
with these storm surges and high water tables.  
Our long-run historical and comparative analysis shows first that
if  institutions do not adapt to meet the changes in the distribution
context, severe floods are more likely to occur (Fig. 6). Economic
inequality per se does not need to affect resilience negatively, as
long as the institutional framework adapts accordingly. Some very
unequal societies thus proved able to cope with floods (Groningen
after 1720, and Flanders in the 16th century to a more limited
extent). What mattered, however, was the interplay between
institutions and the social context. When institutions developed
within an equal distribution of material resources, and inequality
started to rise, this led to more frequent and heavier floods and
recurrent problems with water in all of the cases. This was the
direct effect of inequality on the functioning of these institutions,
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but it may also be argued that the transfer of land to larger
landholders, who lived further away, and the related monetization
of water management, created a distance between the resource
users and the infrastructure, leading to a deterioration of
management (for this line of reasoning elsewhere, see Anderies et
al. 2016). Exact mechanisms are hard to investigate for these
historical cases, to which contemporary observations and
experiments would be better suited, but history enables us to
observe the outcomes at the macro level over a longer period.
These outcomes for resilience as a result of rising inequality were
negative, which in a feedback loop, as a result of the destruction
and distress the major floods caused, led to a further rise of
inequality, as again observed during phases in all three cases.  
It is interesting to notice that a decrease in inequality, unparalleled
by changes in the institutional framework, could produce similar
problems (as demonstrated by Coastal Flanders after 1350).
When institutions in this second stage are adapted and become
fit for a situation of high inequality, however, as seen in Groningen
after 1720, they can sustain resilience in the longer run, as
evidenced by the declining numbers of floods and the extension
of the land surface won on the water. At the same time, these new
institutions also consolidate the high levels of inequality.
Ultimately, both equitable and inequitable societies can
demonstrate resilience in the face of strong hazards such as floods,
but the institutional arrangements used to deal with the hazard
must be suited to the distributive context present.  
The second main conclusion of our historical and comparative
analysis concerns the inevitability of institutional adaptation.
Our analysis shows that even after decreased resilience, in cases
where institutions did not adapt to changing circumstances, and
where this led to a growing incidence of disastrous floods, it was
not at all inevitable that institutions adapted in response to these
pressures (for a comparative study, see Rohland 2018). For
example, increased flooding in 16th-century Guelders and 17th-
century Groningen failed to provoke any kind of necessary
institutional changes. Instead when powerful actors and interest
groups have excessive control over institutions, they may persist
even if  they actually weaken a society’s coping capacity. These
cases, where the incentive of restricted groups outweighs the needs
of the wider community, are most likely to occur when economic
resources are more unequally divided across society, and therefore
inequality itself  becomes a powerful obstacle, or counterweight,
against inevitable posthazard adaptation  
These conclusions are relevant today, although they cannot fully
and directly translate to present situations. First, water
management was organized mainly at a local and regional level,
whereas nowadays the role of states and central bureaucracies are
stronger. Second, as a result of the relatively small geographical
scale of the units used here, differences in value orientation (as
discussed by Jones et al. 2016) do not play a role, whereas
comparing larger areas across the globe may differ and affect
outcomes. Notwithstanding these limitations, the results of the
paper offer empirical evidence of the interplay between economic
inequality and institutional adaptation. They show that neither
high inequality nor types of institutional settings work inevitably
or intrinsically to the detriment of resilience, but changes in one
without the other instead proved to be much more harmful. This
may help explain why research has failed to draw a consistent
connection between inequality and diminishing resilience. This
connection does exist, as this paper shows, but not in a unilinear
way and only in interaction with a process of institutional
adaptation or lack thereof.  
__________  
[1]Thanks to Remi van Schaïk for this reference taken from his
unpublished “calamity calendar.”
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http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/10491
Acknowledgments:
For their suggestions on earlier versions of this paper we thank
Marco Janssen (Arizona), Marten Scheffer (Wageningen), Gerrit
Jasper Schenk (Darmstadt), and Eric Vanhaute (Ghent) and the
participants of the “Coordinating for Life” workshop at Utrecht
University and the WINIR Conference in Boston, 2016. We also
thank Annelies Tukker for her help with the references. We
gratefully acknowledge the support of the European Research
Council (ERC) for the project “Coordinating for Life” (Advanced
Grant no. 339647); the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific
Research (NWO) for the project Why Do Some Epidemics Lead
to Hatred? (VENI Grant no. 275-53-014); and the Flemish Science
Foundation FWO for the project “Shock cities? Food prices and
access to food in Flemish cities in an age of crises (1280-1370).”
LITERATURE CITED
Adger, W. N. 2003. Social capital, collective action, and
adaptation to climate change. Economic Geography 79
(4):387-404.  
Alfani, G., and F. Ammannati. 2017. Long-term trends in
economic inequality: the case of the Florentine state, c. 1300–
1800. Economic History Review 70(4):1072-1102. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1111/ehr.12471  
Alfani, G., and C. Ó Gráda, editors. 2017. Famine in European
history. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. http://dx.
doi.org/10.1017/9781316841235  
Anderies, J. M., M. A. Janssen, and E. Schlager. 2016. Institutions
and the performance of coupled infrastructure systems.
International Journal of the Commons 10(2):495-516. http://dx.
doi.org/10.18352/ijc.651  
Augustyn, B. 1992. Zeespiegelrijzing, transgressiefasen en
stormvloeden in maritiem Vlaanderen tot het einde van de XVIde
eeuw: een landschappelijke, ecologische en klimatologische studie
in historisch perspektief. Algemeen Rijksarchief, Brussels,
Belgium.  
Barnes, M. L., Ö. Bodin, A. M. Guerrero, R. J. McAllister, S. M.
Alexander, and G. Robins. 2017. The social structural foundations
of adaptation and transformation in social-ecological systems.
Ecology and Society 22(4):16. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-09769-220416  
Ecology and Society 23(4): 30
https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol23/iss4/art30/
Baron, W. 2006. ‘Het belang en de welvaart van alle ingezetenen’:
gezondheidszorg in de stad Groningen 1800-1870. Dissertation.
University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands.  
Béné, C., R. M. Al-Hassan, O. Amarasinghe, P. Fong, J. Ocran,
E. Onumah, R. Ratuniata, T. Van Tuyen, J. A. McGregor, and D.
J. Mills. 2016. Is resilience socially constructed? Empirical
evidence from Fiji, Ghana, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam. Global
Environmental Change 38:153-170. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
gloenvcha.2016.03.005  
Blaikie, P., T. Cannon, I. Davis, and B. Wisner. 2004. At risk.
Natural hazards, people’s vulnerability, and disasters. Second
editiion. Routledge, New York, New York, USA.  
Bodin, Ö. 2017. Collaborative environmental governance:
achieving collective action in social-ecological systems. Science 
357(6352):eaan1114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.aan1114  
Botke, I. 2002. Boer en heer: de ‘groninger boer’ 1760-1960. Van
Gorcum, Assen, The Netherlands.  
Brusse, P. 1999. Overleven door ondernemen. De agrarische
geschiedenis van de Over-Betuwe 1650-1850. Landbouwuniversiteit,
Afdeling Agrarische Geschiedenis, Wageningen, The Netherlands.  
Brusse, P. 2018. Property, power and participation in local
administration in the Dutch delta in the early modern period.
Continuity and Change 33(1):59-86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
S0268416018000048  
Buisman, J. 1995-2015. Duizend jaar weer, wind en water in de Lage
Landen. Volumes 1–6. Van Wijnen, Franeker, The Netherlands.  
Carpenter, S. R., and W. A. Brock. 2008. Adaptive capacity and
traps. Ecology and Society 13(2):40. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/
ES-02716-130240  
Carter, M. R., P. D. Little, T. Mogues, and W. Negatu. 2007.
Poverty traps and natural disasters in Ethiopia and Honduras.
World Development 35(5):835-856. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
worlddev.2006.09.010  
Castillo, G. E., and D. Hillier. 2013. No accident: resilience and
the inequality of risk. Oxfam Briefing Paper 172.  
Cinner, J. E. 2011. Social-ecological traps in reef fisheries. Global
Environmental Change 21(3):835-839. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.gloenvcha.2011.04.012  
Crona, B., and Ö. Bodin. 2010. Power asymmetries in small-scale
fisheries: a barrier to governance transformability? Ecology and
Society 15(4):32. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-03710-150432  
Cumming, G. S., D. H. M. Cumming, and C. L. Redman. 2006.
Scale mismatches in social-ecological systems: causes,
consequences, and solutions. Ecology and Society 11(1):14. http://
dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-01569-110114  
Curtis, D. R. 2014a. Coping with crisis: the resilience and
vulnerability of pre-industrial settlements. Ashgate, Farnham,
UK.  
Curtis, D. R. 2014b. The impact of land accumulation and
consolidation on population trends in the pre-industrial period:
two contrasting cases in the Low Countries. Historical Research 
87(236):194-228. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2281.12050  
Curtis, D. R. 2016a. Danger and displacement in the Dollard: the
1509 flooding of the Dollard Sea (Groningen) and its impact on
long-term inequality in the distribution of property. Environment
and History 22(1):103-135. http://dx.doi.org/10.3197/096734016­
X14497391602288  
Curtis, D. R. 2016b. Was plague an exclusively urban
phenomenon? Plague mortality in the seventeenth-century Low
Countries. Journal of Interdisciplinary History 47(2):139-170.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/JINH_a_00975  
Curtis, D. R., B. van Bavel, and T. Soens. 2016. History and the
social sciences: shock therapy with medieval economic history as
patient. Social Science History 40(4):751-774. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1017/ssh.2016.30  
Dangendorf, S., F. M. Calafat, A. Arns, T. Wahl, I. D. Haigh, and
J. Jensen. 2014. Mean sea level variability in the North Sea:
processes and implications. Journal of Geophysical Research:
Oceans 119(10):6820-6841. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/2014JC009901  
Degroot, D. 2018. The frigid Golden Age: climate change, the Little
Ice Age and the Dutch Republic, 1560-1720. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, UK. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108297639  
de Kraker, A. 1997. Landschap uit balans: de invloed van de natuur,
de economie en de politiek op de ontwikkeling van het landschap in
de Vier Ambachten en het Land van Saeftinghe tussen 1488 en 1609. 
Uitgeverij Matrijs, Utrecht, The Netherlands.  
de Kraker, A. 2013. Storminess in the Low Countries, 1350-1725.
Environment and History 19(2):149-171. http://dx.doi.
org/10.3197/096734013X13642082568570  
de Kraker, A. 2015. Flooding in river mouths: human caused or
natural events? Five centuries of flooding events in the SW
Netherlands, 1500-2000. Hydrology and Earth System Sciences 19
(6):2673-2684. http://dx.doi.org/10.5194/hess-19-2673-2015  
Dekker, C., and R. Baetens. 2010. Geld in het water: Antwerps en
Mechels kapitaal in Zuid-Beveland na de stormvloeden in de 16de
eeuw. Verloren, Hilversum, The Netherlands.  
Dombrecht, K., and W. Ryckbosch. 2017. Wealth inequality in a
time of transition: coastal Flanders in the sixteenth century.
Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis/Low
Countries Journal of Social and Economic History 14(2):63-84.
http://dx.doi.org/10.18352/tseg.917  
Endfield, G. H. 2012. The resilience and adaptive capacity of
social-environmental systems in Colonial Mexico. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences USA 109(10):3676-3681. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1114831109  
Enfors, E. 2013. Social-ecological traps and transformations in
dryland agro-ecosystems: using water system innovations to
change the trajectory of development. Global Environmental
Change 23(1):51-60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2012.10.007  
Engle, N. L. 2011. Adaptive capacity and its assessment. Global
Environmental Change 21(2):647-656. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.gloenvcha.2011.01.019  
Fabinyi, M., L. Evans, and S. J. Foale. 2014. Social-ecological
systems, social diversity, and power: insights from anthropology
and political ecology. Ecology and Society 19(4):28. http://dx.doi.
org/10.5751/ES-07029-190428  
Ecology and Society 23(4): 30
https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol23/iss4/art30/
Folke, C., S. R. Carpenter, B. Walker, M. Scheffer, T. Chapin, and
J. Rockström. 2010. Resilience thinking: integrating resilience,
adaptability and transformability. Ecology and Society 15(4):20.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-03610-150420  
Folke, C., T. Hahn, P. Olsson, and J. Norberg. 2005. Adaptive
governance of social-ecological systems. Annual Review of
Environment and Resources 30:441-473. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/
annurev.energy.30.050504.144511  
Galloway, J. A. 2009. Storm flooding, coastal defense and land
use around the Thames estuary and tidal river c.1250-1450.
Journal of Medieval History 35(2):171-188. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.jmedhist.2008.12.001  
Gottschalk, M. 1971. Stormvloeden en rivieroverstromingen in
Nederland. Volume I. Van Gorcum, Assen, The Netherlands.  
Gottschalk, M. 1975. Stormvloeden en rivieroverstromingen in
Nederland. Volume II. Van Gorcum, Assen, The Netherlands.  
Gottschalk, M. 1977. Stormvloeden en rivieroverstromingen in
Nederland. Volume III. Van Gorcum, Assen, The Netherlands.  
Hoddinott, J. 2006. Shocks and their consequences across and
within households in rural Zimbabwe. Journal of Development
Studies 42(2):301-321. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00220380500405501  
Homeier, H. 1970. Die Allerheiligenflut von 1570 in Ostfriesland.
Pages 62-78 in K. de Vries and J. P. Winsemius, editors. De
Allerheiligenvloed van 1570. Miedema Pers, Leeuwarden, The
Netherlands.  
Hoppenbrouwers, P. 1991. Grondgebruik en agrarische
bedrijfsstructuur in het Oldambt na de vroegste inpolderingen
(ca. 1630-ca. 1720). Pages 73-95 in J. Elerie and P.
Hoppenbrouwers, editors. Het Oldambt, deel 2. Nieuw visies op
geschiedenis en actuele problemen. Nederlands Agronomisch
Historisch Instituut, Groningen, The Netherlands.  
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 2014.
Summary for policymakers. In C. B. Field, V. R. Barros, D. J.
Dokken, K. J. Mach, M. D. Mastrandrea, T. E. Bilir, M.
Chatterjee, K. L. Ebi, Y. O. Estrada, R. C. Genova, B. Girma, E.
S. Kissel, A. N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P. R. Mastrandrea, and L.
L. White, editors. Climate change 2014: impacts, adaptation, and
vulnerability. Part A: global and sectoral aspects. Contribution of
Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK.  
Jakubowski-Tiessen, M. 1992. Sturmflut 1717: die Bewältigung
einer Naturkatastrophe in der Frühen Neuzeit. R. Oldenbourg
Verlag, Munich, Germany. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783486828023  
Jones, N. A., S. Shaw, H. Ross, K. Witt, and B. Pinner. 2016. The
study of human values in understanding and managing social-
ecological systems. Ecology and Society 21(1):15. http://dx.doi.
org/10.5751/ES-07977-210115  
Kahn, M. E. 2005. The death toll from natural disasters: the role
of income, geography, and institutions. Review of Economics and
Statistics 87(2):271-284. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/0034653053970339  
Kaufmann, M., J. Lewandowski, A. Choryński, and M. Wiering.
2016. Shock events and flood risk management: a media analysis
of the institutional long-term effects of flood events in the
Netherlands and Poland. Ecology and Society 21(4):51. http://dx.
doi.org/10.5751/ES-08764-210451  
Klein, R. J. T., G. F. Midgley, B. L. Preston, M. Alam, F. G. H.
Berkhout, K. Dow, and M. R. Shaw. 2014. Adaptation
opportunities, constraints, and limits. Chapter 16 in C. B. Field,
V. R. Barros, D. J. Dokken, K. J. Mach, M. D. Mastrandrea, T.
E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K. L. Ebi, Y. O. Estrada, R. C. Genova,
B. Girma, E. S. Kissel, A. N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P. R.
Mastrandrea, and L. L. White, editors. Climate change 2014:
impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. Part A: global and sectoral
aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.  
Knottnerus, O. 2004. Yeoman and farmers in the Wadden Sea
coastal marshes, c.1500-1900. Pages 149-186 in B. J. P. van Bavel,
and P. Hoppenbrouwers, editors. Landholding and land transfer in
the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century). Brepols,
Turnhout, Belgium.  
Knottnerus, O. 2013. Reclamations and submerged lands in the
Ems River estuary (900-1500). Pages 241-266 in E. Thoen, G. J.
Borger, A. M. J. de Kraker, T. Soens, D. Tys, L. Vervaet, and H.
J. T. Weerts, editors. Landscapes or seascapes? The history of the
coastal environment in the North Sea area reconsidered. Brepols,
Turnhout, Belgium.  
Kuys, J., L. de Leeuw, V. Paquay, and R. van Schaïk, editors. 1983.
De Tielse Kroniek: een geschiedenis van de Lage Landen van de
Volksverhuizingen tot het midden van de vijftiende eeuw, met een
vervolg over de jaren 1552-1566. Verloren, Hilversum, The
Netherlands.  
Ligtendag, W. 1995. De Wolden en het water: de landschaps- en
waterstaatsontwikkeling in het lage land ten oosten van de stad
Groningen vanaf de volle middeleeuwen tot ca. 1870. Van Dijk &
Foorthuis, Groningen, The Netherlands.  
Moorman van Kappen, O., J. Korf, and, O. W. A. Baron van
Verschuer. 1977. Tieler- en Bommelerwaarden 1327-1977. Grepen
uit de geschiedenis van 650 jaar waterstaatszorg in Tielerwaard en
Bommelerwaard. Polderdistrict Tielerwaard en Polderdistrict
Bommelerwaard: Tiel/Zaltbommel, The Netherlands.  
Nee, V., and P. Ingram. 1998. Embeddedness and beyond:
institutions, exchange and social structure. Pages 19-45 in M. C.
Brinton and V. Nee, editors. The new institutionalism in sociology. 
Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, California, USA.  
Nijenhuis, H. D. 1992. Hulsterambacht. Penningkohieren
1570-1580. Afdeling Zeeland van de Nederlandse Genealogische
Vereniging, Hulst, The Netherlands.  
Ogilvie, S. 2007. ‘Whatever is, is right?’ Economic institutions in
pre-industrial Europe. Economic History Review 60(4):649-684.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0289.2007.00408.x  
Paping, R. 1995. Voor een handvol stuivers: de levensstandaard van
boeren, arbeiders en middenstanders op de Groninger klei,
1770-1860. Nederlands Agronomisch Historisch Instituut,
Groningen, The Netherlands.  
Paping, R. 2017. De kerstvloed van 1717 in Vliedorp en
Wierhuizen. Stad en Lande 26(4):10-13.  
Ecology and Society 23(4): 30
https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol23/iss4/art30/
Pelling, M. 2003. The vulnerability of cities: natural disasters and
social resilience. Earthscan, London, UK.  
Rheinheimer, M. 2003. ‘Mythos Sturmflut.’ Der Kamp gegen das
Meer und die Suche nach Identität. Demokratische Geschichte 
15:9-58.  
Rienks, K. A., and D. Rienst-Wallinga. 1970. De Allerheljenfloed
fan 1570 yn Grinslân. Pages 41-61 in K. de Vries and J. P.
Winsemius, editors. De Allerheiligenvloed van 1570. Miedema
Pers, Leeuwarden, The Netherlands.  
Rippon, S. 2000. The transformation of coastal wetlands:
exploitation and management of marshland landscapes in North
West Europe during the Roman and medieval periods. Oxford
University Press, Oxford, UK.  
Rohland, E. 2018. Adapting to hurricanes: a historical perspective
on New Orleans from its foundation to Hurricane Katrina,
1718-2005. WIREs Climate Change 9(1):e488. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1002/wcc.488  
Schroor, M. 2014. Rurale metropool. Bevolking, migratie en
financiën van de stad Groningen ten tijde van de Republiek
(1595-1795). Nederlands Agronomisch Historisch Instituut,
Groningen, The Netherlands.  
Smith, T. 2014. Warping and parliamentary enclosure: the
example of north-west Lindsey, Lincolnshire. Agricultural
History Review 62(1):83-97.  
Soens, T. 2009. De spade in de dijk? Waterbeheer en rurale
samenleving in de Vlaamse kustvlakte (1280-1580). Academia
Press, Ghent, Belgium. http://dx.doi.org/10.26530/OAPEN_611030  
Soens, T. 2011. Floods and money: funding drainage and flood
control in Coastal Flanders from the thirteenth to the sixteenth
centuries. Continuity and Change 26(3):333-365. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1017/S0268416011000221  
Soens, T. 2013a. The social distribution of land and flood risk
along the North Sea Coast: Flanders, Holland and Romney
Marsh compared (c. 1200-1750). Pages 147-179 in B. van Bavel
and E. Thoen, editors. Rural societies and environments at risk:
ecology, property rights and social organisation in fragile areas
(Middle Ages-Twentieth century). Brepols, Turnhout, Belgium.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1484/M.RURHE-EB.4.00111  
Soens, T. 2013b. Flood security in the medieval and early modern
North Sea area: a question of entitlement? Environment and
History 19:209-232. http://dx.doi.org/10.3197/096734013X1364­
2082568651  
Soens, T. 2018. Resilient societies, vulnerable people: coping with
North Sea floods before 1800. Past & Present 241:143-177. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gty018  
Soens, T., and E. Thoen. 2008. The origins of leasehold in the
former county of Flanders. Pages 31-55 in B. van Bavel, and P. R.
Schofield, editors. The development of leasehold in Northwestern
Europe, c. 1200-1600. Brepols, Turnhout, Belgium. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1484/M.CORN-EB.3.313  
Soens, T., D. Tys, and E. Thoen. 2014. Landscape transformation
and social change in the North Sea polders, the example of
Flanders (1000-1800 AD). Siedlungsforschung. Archäologie-
Geschichte-Geographie 31:133-160.  
Sundberg, A. 2015. Floods, worms and cattle plague: nature-
induced disaster at the closing of the Dutch Golden Age, 1672-1764. 
Dissertation. University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, USA.  
Suursaar, Ü, J. Jaagus, and H. Tõnisson. 2015. How to quantify
long-term changes in coastal sea storminess? Estuarine, Coastal
and Shelf Science 156:31-41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
ecss.2014.08.001  
't Hart, M. 1998. Rulers and repertoires: the revolt of a farmers’
republic in the early modern Netherlands. Pages 197-212 in M.
Hanagan, L. Page Morch, and W. te Brake, editors. Challenging
authority: the historical study of contentious politics. University
of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA.  
TeBrake, W. 1993. A plague of insurrection: popular politics and
peasant revolt in Flanders, 1323-1328. University of Pennsylvania
Press, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA.  
Thoen, E., and T. Soens. 2015. The family or the farm: a Sophie’s
Choice? The late medieval crisis in Flanders. Pages 196-224 in J.
Drendel, editor. Crisis in the later Middle Ages: beyond the Postan-
Duby paradigm. Brepols, Turnhout, Belgium. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1484/M.TMC.5.103788  
Tierney, K. J. 2007. From the margins to the mainstream? Disaster
research at the crossroads. Annual Review of Sociology 33
(1):503-525. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131743  
Tys, D. 2013. The medieval embankment of coastal Flanders in
context. Pages 199-239 in E. Thoen, G. J. Borger, A. M. J. de
Kraker, T. Soens, D. Tys, L. Vervaet, and H. J. T. Weerts, editors.
Landscapes or seascapes? The history of the coastal environment
in the North Sea area reconsidered. Brepols, Turnhout, Belgium.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1484/M.CORN.1.101554  
Ufkes, T. 1984. De Kerstvloed van 1717: oorzaken en gevolgen van
een natuurramp. Dissertation. University of Groningen,
Groningen, The Netherlands.  
van Bavel, B. 1993. Goederenverwerving en goederenbeheer van de
abdij Mariënweerd (1129-1592). Verloren, Hilversum, The
Netherlands.  
van Bavel, B. 1999. Transitie en continuïteit: de bezitsverhoudingen
en de plattelands-economie in het westelijk gedeelte van het Gelderse
rivierengebied (ca 1300-ca. 1570). Verloren, Hilversum, The
Netherlands.  
van Bavel, B. 2001. Land, lease and agriculture: the transition of
the rural economy in the Dutch river area from the fourteenth to
the sixteenth century. Past & Present 172(1):3-43. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1093/past/172.1.3  
van Bavel, B. 2004. The land market in the North Sea area in a
comparative perspective, 13th-18th centuries. Pages 119-146 in S.
Cavaciocchi, editor. Il mercato della terra secc. XIII-XVIII. Le
Monnier, Bagno a Ripoli, Italy.  
van Bavel, B. 2010. Manors and markets: economy and society in
the Low Countries, 500-1600. Oxford University Press, Oxford,
UK. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278664.001.0001  
van Bavel, B. 2015. History as a laboratory to better understand
the formation of institutions. Journal of Institutional Economics 
11(1):69-91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1744137414000216  
Ecology and Society 23(4): 30
https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol23/iss4/art30/
van Bavel, B., and D. R. Curtis. 2016. Better understanding
disasters by better using history: systematically using the
historical record as one way to advance research into disasters.
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 34
(1):143-69.  
van Besouw, B., and D. R. Curtis. 2018. Death at a distance?
Warfare and mortality in the seventeenth-century Low Countries.
Economic History Association Annual Meeting, Montreal,
Canada, September 7-9. [online] URL: http://eh.net/eha/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/Besouw.pdf  
van Cruyningen, P. 2014. From disaster to sustainability: floods,
changing property relations and water management in the south-
western Netherlands, c.1500-1800. Continuity and Change 29
(2):241-265. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0268416014000149  
van Tielhof, M. 2015. Forced solidarity: maintenance of coastal
defences along the North Sea coast in the early modern period.
Environment and History 21(3):319-350. http://dx.doi.
org/10.3197/096734015X14345369355746  
Vermue, A. F. 2012. Noordbroek: een interdisciplinair onderzoek
naar de vorming en ingebruikname van de kleilanden in de 15de en
16de eeuw. Thesis. University of Groningen, Groningen, The
Netherlands.  
Vervaet, L. 2015. Goederenbeheer in een veranderende
samenleving: het Sint-Janshospitaal van Brugge, ca. 1275-ca. 1575. 
Dissertation. University of Ghent, Ghent, Belgium.  
Walker, B., C. S. Holling, S. R. Carpenter, and A. Kinzig. 2004.
Resilience, adaptability and transformability in social-ecological
systems. Ecology and Society 9(2):5. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/
ES-00650-090205  
Wetter, O., C. Pfister, R. Weingartner, J. Luterbacher, T. Reist,
and J. Trösch. 2011. The largest floods in the High Rhine basin
since 1268 assessed from documentary and instrumental evidence.
Hydrological Sciences Journal 56(5):733-758. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/02626667.2011.583613
